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THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY'S USE OF
DRUG COURIER PROFILES: ONE SIZE
FITS ALL
When the Framers drafted the United States Constitution, they shared a
common underlying objective: to protect citizens and safeguard future gen-
erations from abusive and overzealous control on the part of the newly cre-
ated federal government. 1  Similarly, the Bill of Rights2 was adopted to
dispel the fear shared by American citizens of an intrusive and unrestrained
government pursuing policy goals separate from those of the people it gov-
erned.3 The Fourth Amendment in particular provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
1. See Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 889 (1987). "The framers of the Constitution, animated by the
spirit of William Pitt's dictum that '[u]nlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those who
possess it,' carefully parcelled out governmental power and controlled its exercise." Id. (alter-
ation in original) (footnote omitted).
2. The Bill of Rights encompasses the first ten amendments to the Constitution, provid-
ing for the guarantee of individual rights and freedoms. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 168 (6th
ed. 1990). After the ratification of the Constitution in 1787, the "central constitutional preoc-
cupation with limiting governmental power manifested itself in the call for adoption of a Bill of
Rights." Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 889. "[T]he core of the Bill of Rights [constitutes] a code
of criminal procedure designed to ensure fair treatment and make it difficult for the govern-
ment to secure a criminal conviction." Id.
3. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 364 (1974) (discussing the role of the Bill of Rights in checking the power
of the federal government).
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reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."' 4 This right to per-
sonal security protects people, not places.5
Today, the United States Supreme Court balances individual rights
against society's need for effective law enforcement in determining the extent
to which the government may infringe upon an individual's personal liber-
ties.' This interplay between the individual, society and the government' is
driven by the needs of society, achieved through the control elements of gov-
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In order to search a person, the Fourth Amendment re-
quires that a warrant be issued upon probable cause, that it be supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and that it describe with particularity the location to be searched and the individuals or
items to be seized. Id. In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, referred to the need for police questioning as an important tool in the
effective enforcement of criminal laws. As long as the individual to whom the questions are
addressed remains free to walk away, there has been no intrusion and no "seizure" of that
person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 554. Justice Stewart reasoned
that characterizing every street encounter between an individual and the police as a seizure
would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions on law enforcement, and would not enhance in
any appreciable way the interest secured by the Fourth Amendment. Id. See also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (holding that a limited exception to the probable cause rule,
circumscribed by the "specific and articulable facts" standard, is in keeping with the Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). With law enforcement's need to interact with and investi-
gate individuals clearly in mind, the Mendenhall Court also noted that " '[w]ithout such inves-
tigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might
wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security of all
would be diminished.'" Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (citation omitted) (quoting Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 255 (1973)). The Supreme Court's decisions concerning Fourth
Amendment search and seizure issues have not indicated any consistent approach for the gov-
ernment to take in their efforts to ensure the protection of individual rights. Alec Farmer,
Note, Criminal Procedure - "Drug Courier Profile" Characteristics are Sufficient to Establish
Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Conduct, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 407, 408-09 (1989).
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). "[W]herever an individual may har-
bor a reasonable 'expectaion of privacy,'. . . he is entitled to be free from unreasonable govern-
mental intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (citation omitted). In Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250 (1891), the Supreme Court recognized, "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law." Id. at 251.
6. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on
the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV., 1258, 1264 (1990); see, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975) (holding that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a suffi-
cient governmental interest is enough to warrant a temporary detention for limited question-
ing); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (holding that in the interest of effective law enforcement, police
have the authority to make an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion). See infra
notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
7. The United States Supreme Court assumes a very deferential posture toward
majoritarian decisionmaking, which reflects the conservative ideology of those who sit on the
bench. As a result, the government generally wins constitutional cases, and as a consequence
the Court is unresponsive to the need for protection of individual rights. Erwin Chemerinsky,
Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 56-57 (1989). See, e.g., United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1989) (holding that a DEA agent's use of a drug courier
profile does not detract from the requisite "specific and articulable" basis for a finding of rea-
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ernment, and tempered by the rights of the individual.' Changes in societal
norms and the resultant social policies demonstrate the constant ebb and
flow of power between the government and those governed by it.9 Today,
the courts must strike a new balance between governmental power and indi-
vidual rights against a pressing, pervasive and destructive force: the war on
drugs. ° In a number of recent decisions, federal courts have addressed the
issue of drug courier profiles and their constitutional acceptability as a way
sonable suspicion); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (upholding a warrantless naked-
eye surveillance of a suspect's home).
8. The balance between individual rights and governmental power is in a constant state
of flux. "The gradual accretion of enforcement powers moves so slowly as to be invisible to the
untrained eye. The rights of citizens recede by gradual erosion, by relentless nibbling, rather
than gobbling." Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 923.
9. On October 2, 1982, President Reagan gave a speech denouncing illegal drugs. This
speech reflected the prevailing attitude that cracking down on illegal drugs had become a na-
tional imperative, and law enforcement agencies would be accorded greater power to achieve
this goal. Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 890-95; see also infra note 17.
10. As of 1982, over 3000 parents' groups had become actively involved with the National
Federation of Parents for Drug Free Youth. Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 891. Based on citizen
concern and the danger related to illegal drug trafficking, the fight to stop illegal drug import-
ing and sale in the United States is now a national priority. "Since the early 1980s, the prevail-
ing attitude has been that cracking down on drugs is imperative. As a result, the three
branches of government have deferred very little to constitutional and nonconstitutional limits
on the exercise of governmental power in the domain of drug enforcement." Id. at 890. Fol-
lowing the President's Message Announcing Federal Initiatives Against Drug Trafficking and
Organized Crime, President Reagan requested and received:
(1) more personnel-1020 law enforcement agents for the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other agencies, 200 As-
sistant United States Attorneys, and 340 clerical staff; (2) more aggressive law en-
forcement-creating 12 (later 13) regional prosecutorial task forces across the nation
"to identify, investigate, and prosecute members of high-level drug trafficking enter-
prises, and to destroy the operations of those organizations;" (3) more money-
$127.5 million in additional funding and substantial reallocation of the existing
$702.8 million budget from prevention, treatment, and research programs to law en-
forcement programs; (4) more prison bed space-the addition of 1260 beds at 11
federal prisons to accommodate the increase in drug offenders to be incarcerated;
(5) more stringent laws-a "legislative offensive designed to win approval of re-
forms" with respect to bail, sentencing, criminal forfeiture, and the exclusionary rule;
(6) better interagency coordination-bringing together all federal law enforcement
agencies in "a comprehensive attack on drug trafficking and organized crime" under
a Cabinet-level committee chaired by the Attorney General; and (7) improved fed-
eral-state coordination, including federal assistance to state agencies by training their
agents.
Id. at 890-91 n.10 (citing President's Message Announcing Federal Initiatives Against Drug
Trafficking and Organized Crime, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1311, 1313-14 (Oct. 14
1982)). The United States has spent $475 million in military, law enforcement and economic
aid in South American drug-producing countries in an effort to stem the tide of drugs. Doug-
las Farah & Michael Isikoff, 'Drug Summit' to Convene as Supply Surges, WASH. POST, Feb.
25, 1992, at A5. Despite this aid, there is no indication that there is less cocaine coming out of
South America. Id. See also infra note 17 (explaining the Reagan administration's attempt to
make law enforcement efforts to curtail illegal drug trafficking more efficient).
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to enforce laws designed to stem the flow of illegal drugs." The drug cou-
rier profile, formulated by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),' 2 is a re-
sponse to the DEA's growing need for effective tactics to gain the upperhand
in the war on drugs. The profile is a compilation of personal characteristics
which experience has shown may be indicative of an individual's involve-
ment in illegal drug trafficking activity. 3 In order to establish the reason-
able suspicion necessary to stop and question a suspect, the officer must be
able to demonstrate with specific and articulable facts a reasonable belief
that the suspect is committing or has just committed a crime.14 Unfortu-
nately, the inconsistent application of facets of the drug courier profile by
DEA agents leads to inconsistent tests used by the United States courts of
appeals concerning the scope of the drug courier profile. The result of this
inconsistency, however, raises serious constitutional questions regarding
drug courier profiles.' 5
United States v. Hooper,'6 a recent case handed down by the Second Cir-
cuit addressing the issue of drug courier profiles, embodies the federal
courts' attempt to facilitate the war on drugs at all levels of government by
broadening the powers accorded to law enforcement agencies and officials.
The Hooper decision helps illustrate the problems that accompany drug cou-
rier profiles and their use by law enforcement officials in establishing the
requisite reasonable suspicion to support any resultant stop and search of the
11. See also United States v. Bradley, 923 F.2d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding
agents' use of the drug courier profile as a means of establishing reasonable suspicion); United
States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 1407-10 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the agents' use of the
drug courier profile violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment protections); United States v.
Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506, 1510 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding agents' use of drug courier profile
and passenger list as a means of establishing reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 764
(1991); United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 820 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding agents' use of drug
courier profile in a consensual encounter between defendant and law enforcement officials).
Since 1974, the DEA has assigned "highly skilled agents to the major airports as part of a
nationwide program to intercept drug couriers." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 508 n.2
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring). These agents use a "drug courier profile" to identify certain
characteristics that experience has shown to be "relevant in identifying suspects" known for
drug importing. Id. See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562 (1980) (noting
that federal agents have developed drug courier profiles that outline characteristics generally
associated with those involved in illegal drug activity).
12. See infra notes 57-61 and acompanying text.
13. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
14. See infra part IA.
15. See infra part IV.
16. 935 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663 (1991).
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individual. 7 In Hooper,"8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit attempted to infuse some credibility and tangible form to a prac-
tice which is, by design, nebulous in nature.1 9 Confusion remains, however,
regarding the characteristics necessary to establish the requisite reasonable
suspicion for a stop and search of an individual.2"
This Comment focuses on the use of "drug courier profiles" by law en-
forcement officials as a foundation for establishing the reasonable suspicion
necessary to seize an individual within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. First, this Comment examines the use of profiles and the growing
body of case law that is redefining the parameters of the relationship which
exists between the citizens and their government. Next, this Comment ex-
amines whether the circuit courts' attempt to facilitate the efforts of law
enforcement is leading our society down a dangerous path of diminishing
individual rights.2" This Comment suggests that the circuit court decisions
demonstrate that the inconsistencies of the drug courier profile provide an
opportunity for arbitrary and abusive governmental intrusion. This Com-
ment concludes that the nebulous nature of the drug courier profile sacrifices
fundamental rights to facilitate administrative efficiency on the part of law
enforcement. This Comment proposes, therefore, that a consistent test be
applied by the courts to guarantee that individual rights are adequately
protected.
I. EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT-AT WHAT PRICE?
A. Protection of Fourth Amendment Rights
Traditionally, law enforcement officials had to show probable cause to jus-
tify both the issuance of a warrant and to support a warrantless search and
17. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(a), 0.102 (1986). The Reagan administration acted to "stream-
line operations and force more cooperation among enforcement agencies. It placed the FBI in
charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and gave it major drug enforcement
responsibility for the first time in history." Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 892; see also id. (outlin-
ing the Reagan administration's efforts to construct what amounted to a "Maginot Line" de-
fense consisting of surveillance and interdiction measures to prevent the drug flow along the
United States coastline, and the creation of a network of Organized Crime Drug Enforcement
Task Forces in order to increase prosecutorial efficiency).
18. Hooper, 935 F.2d at 484.
19. See infra part IID, notes 196, 200, 205, 215-19, 225, 233, 241, 243.
20. Case law has shown that there is no one drug courier profile, but rather, there are an
"infinite [number of] drug courier profiles .... [T]he profiles do not predetermine just what
combination of suspicious factors must exist for a lawful stop, an especially critical matter
given that some of those factors (for example, traveling from a source city) 'describe a very
large category of presumably innocent travelers.' " Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion
by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in
Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 442, 482-83 (1990).
21. Id. See also infra notes 245, 252, 259-60.
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seizure.22 This threshold requirement is met "where 'the facts and circum-
stances within ... [the officers'] knowledge and of which [they] had reason-
ably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution ... that' an offense has been or is being committed."23
In Terry v. Ohio,24 the Supreme Court created new caveats in the common
law rule that the arrest of an individual was a seizure of that person, and
could only be justified by a showing of probable cause by the officer making
the arrest.25 In Terry,26 a police officer observed the defendants repeatedly
walking back and forth in front of a store window.27 Suspecting that the
defendants were casing the store before robbing it,28 the officer approached
the defendants and asked for identification.29 After preliminary questioning,
the officer grabbed Terry and patted down the outside of his clothing.3° The
search produced a gun from Terry's overcoat pocket.3 ' Terry and the code-
fendants were then placed under arrest.3 2
22. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (holding that a relaxation of the
probable cause requirement would expose law abiding citizens to overzealous law enforcement
tactics). Prior to Terry, the Court had clearly established that a citizen "was entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 9 (1968). Probable cause requires "that the facts and circumstances within [the officer's
knowledge are] ... sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that" the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 162 (1925). This common law standard served as the brightline rule for assessing
"the legitimacy of seizures of the person" prior to Terry. Maclin, supra note 6, at 1268.
23. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162).
The common law rule required a showing of probable cause for both the issuance of a warrant
and a warrantless search. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 479.
24. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
25. The Terry Court was urged to make distinctions between a "stop" and an "arrest" and
between a "frisk" and a "search," thereby allowing law enforcement officials to stop a person
and detain him briefly for investigative questioning upon the officer's reasonable suspicion. Id.
at 10. Reasonable suspicion requires the officer to have a reasonable suspicion supported by
articulable facts that criminal activity "may be afoot." Id. at 30. The officer's reasonable
suspicion requires "some minimal level of objective justification" for making the stop. INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984). See Farmer supra note 4, at 416.
26. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
27. Id. The officer was patrolling in plain clothes when he first noticed the defendants.
Id. He testified that he had never seen the men before and was unable to say what exactly
drew his attention to them. Id.
28. Id. at 6. Drawing on his 39 years of experience, the police officer testified that he
suspected the defendants of "casing a job." Id.
29. Id. at 6-7.
30. Id. at 7. When the defendants mumbled an answer in response to the officer's demand
for identification, he grabbed Terry and patted down his overcoat, where he felt a pistol. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The officer patted down the other two defendants and found another gun in a
second defendant's overcoat. Id. The officer testified that he only patted the defendants down
to see whether they had weapons, and that he did not put his hands beneath the outer gar-
ments until he felt their guns. Id.
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The majority in Terry created legally recognized, intermediate gradations
of suspicion not amounting to probable cause, but serving as an adequate
legal basis for police interaction.3 3 The resulting compromise between the
needs of law enforcement and the rights of the individual permits the police
to make what is commonly referred to as a "Terry stop."' 34 The Court
stated that law enforcement officials should be allowed to "stop" a person
and detain him briefly for questioning if the law enforcement official can
demonstrate, based on the totality of the circumstances, a "reasonable suspi-
cion" that "crime is afoot."35 If, after the initial stop, the officer has a rea-
sonable suspicion that the individual may be armed, the officer has the power
to "frisk" him for weapons to ensure the officer's personal safety.36 If the
"stop" and the "frisk" give rise to probable cause to believe that the suspect
has committed a crime, the officer is empowered to make a formal "arrest"
and a full search of the person incident to that arrest.37
The Court's requirement that the officer point to "specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reason-
ably warrant the intrusion, '"38 provided a greater degree of latitude to of-
33. Id. at 16-20. The Terry Court determined that there must be a narrowly drawn au-
thority to permit a stop and incidental search of an individual for the protection and safety of
the police officer. Where the officer can show a reasonable suspicion that the individual was
involved in an illegal activity, and that the individual was armed and dangerous, he can effect a
stop and frisk without probable cause. Id. at 27.
34. On the one hand, the Court recognized law enforcement's "need [for] an escalating set
of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess" in order
to deal with "often dangerous situations [unfolding] on city streets." Id. at 10. On the other
hand, the Court recognized that "the authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed by
the law of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the traditional jurisprudence of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 11. See generally Maclin, supra note 6, at 1269 (summarizing the
compromise between Fourth Amendment protections and effective law enforcement embodied
in the Terry limited exception).
35. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10. In fashioning this new limited exception, the Court was re-
sponding to law enforcement's need to deal with potentially dangerous situations. Id. The
Court focused on the governmental interest justifying the intrusion upon an individual's
Fourth Amendment rights for guidance in determining the reasonableness of a Terry-type
stop. Id. at 19-22.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 21. Subsequent to the initial stop, Terry provided for a narrowly focused search
of the individual if the officer could demonstrate a reasonable belief that the suspect was carry-
ing a weapon. Id. at 21-22. The scope of the search must be limited to a pat-down search or,
to what is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or
others nearby. Id. at 23-25. This limited search has been characterized by the Court as
amounting to less than a "full" search even though it remains a serious intrusion. Id. at 26.
This limited search balanced the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him," against the need of the individual to be secure
in his person and from unreasonable searches by law enforcement agents. Id. at 23. When the
officer has a reasonable belief that the individual is engaged in criminal activity, the focus of
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ficers who suspect an individual but fall short of probable cause.39 By doing
so, Terry provided law enforcement officials with new parameters for police/
citizen interaction through the creation of an objective test which allows law
enforcement officials to predict the ramifications of their conduct and en-
sures a uniform application of Fourth Amendment protection.' To enforce
its holding, the Terry Court held that evidence gained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment would be excluded from trial.4 '
In Sibron v. New York,4 2 the Court added substance to the newly created
framework of the Terry "reasonable suspicion" limited exception to the
"probable cause" common law rule. The Sibron Court held that an officer
could make an investigative stop of an individual based on less than probable
cause.43 The Sibron majority found that not every encounter between a law
interest shifts from protection of the individual's Fourth Amendment rights to investigating
the crime. Id.
39. The Terry Court emphasized the need for effective crime prevention and detection,
stating that it is this interest "which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest." Id. at 22.
40. In order to ensure the uniform application of Fourth Amendment protections to all
individuals, the Terry Court required an objective finding of reasonable suspicion by the officer,
noting that if the Court were to follow a subjective "good faith" test, "the protections of the
Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police." Id. at 22 (quoting Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)). In Terry, the Court held that an officer may make a brief
investigative stop of an individual so long as that stop is supported by specific, articulable facts
sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Mark G. Ledwin, The Use
of the Drug Courier Profile in Traffic Stops: Valid Police Practice or Fourth Amendment Viola-
tion?, 15 OHio N.U. L. REV. 593, 596 (1988). The Terry standard of "reasonable suspicion" is
the underlying principle to the primary issue in Hooper. In Hooper, the court looked to see if
observations made by the agents pursuant to the characteristics outlined in the profile gave rise
to a foundation of reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop. United States v. Hooper,
935 F.2d 484, 490-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663 (1991).
41. To insure strict compliance on the part of law enforcement officials, the Court re-
quired that any evidence gathered as a result of the stop be declared as legally obtained only if
the officer establishes the requisite reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. Id. at 12-13. Cit-
ing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Terry Court held that, in order to protect
fundamental Fourth Amendment principles, the only effective deterrent to police misconduct
in the criminal context is to exclude from evidence at trial any evidence obtained as the result
of an illegal search and seizure of an individual. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. Failure to show reason-
able suspicion to support the initial stop, and the subsequent formation of probable cause prior
to a prolonged detention or extended search of the individual would result in the inadmissabil-
ity of all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop and search, pursuant to the exclusion-
ary rule set forth in Weeks. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 4 (holding that evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissable against the defendant, thereby discouraging police
misconduct by removing the incentive for illegal searches and seizures).
42. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
43. Id. at 43-44, 63-65. In Sibron, a police officer observed the defendant for a period of
hours talking to a number of known narcotics addicts. Id. at 45, 62. The officer did not
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enforcement officer and a citizen qualified as an intrusion requiring an objec-
tive justification.' The Court held that a person is seized within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment only when, by show of authority or by means
of physical force, his freedom of movement is restrained.45 Moreover, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment are not at issue if the person ques-
tioned by law enforcement officials remains free to disregard the questions
and walk away.46 Decided on the same day as Terry, Sibron represented the
Court's initial attempt to clarify the nature and quality of police-citizen
interaction.47
The rules outlined in Terry and Sibron establish the proper procedure to
classify and analyze interaction between police and citizens.48 This thresh-
old determination dictates the legal standards a court must use in reaching
an objective determination as to a police officer's right to investigate bal-
anced against the individual's right to be free from arbitrary and unjustifi-
able investigations.49 The principles set forth by the Court in Terry and
overhear any of these conversations and saw nothing pass between Sibron and the others. Id.
The Court concluded that the officer could not reasonably infer, based on who Sibron was
talking to, that he was involved in criminal activity. Id. Later that evening, after observing
the conversation between Sibron and the others, the officer observed Sibron enter a restaurant.
Id. at 45. The officer then entered the restaurant and asked Sibron to step outside. Id. Sibron
complied, and was arrested following a subsequent unlawful search by the officer. Id.
44. Id. at 62-66.
45. Id. at 63. The Court found no indication in the record whether the defedant accompa-
nied the officer outside "in submission to a show of force or authority which left him no choice,
or whether he went voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation with the officer's investiga-
tion." Id.
46. Id.
47. See Maclin, supra note 6, at 1268 n.45 (explaining how Terry and Sibron are used as
foundation for later "reasonable suspicion" cases). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31
(1968) (setting forth the reasonable suspicion exception); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (noting that not every encounter between an individual and a police
officer is an intrusion for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that an individual is seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes only when, "by means of physical force or a show of authority,
his freedom of movement is restrained."). Id.
48. The post-Terry cases, including Sibron, clearly defined a new right-to-inquire rule to
allow law enforcement officials to stop, and in some cases, search an individual for investiga-
tive purposes where probable cause is lacking. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727-28
(1969) (acknowledging that there may be instances where an individual may be seized in order
to obtain fingerprints without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 145-47 (1972) (holding that a police officer had not violated Fourth Amendment
protections when he approached a vehicle occupied by the defendant, and based on an inform-
ant's tip which amounted to less than probable cause, reached in and grabbed a revolver from
the defendant's waistband).
49. The growing confusion among courts concerning the threshold level of suspicion re-
quired to support a stop of an individual by law enforcement officials has shifted the balance in
favor of effective law enforcement by the government. As evidenced by one commentator,
"the Court's message is obvious: The lower courts need not formulate concrete standards for
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Sibron constitute the basis for lower courts' analysis associated with cases
involving the use of drug courier profiles.5"
B. Fourth Amendment Protections and the Drug Courier Profile
In 1968, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) created the first
"profile."5 The FAA designed the profile based on DEA agents' testimony
and court decisions to serve as a screening device to detect and deter possible
hijackings of United States airliners.52 While the DEA's list of characteris-
tics which comprise the profile have never been publicly disclosed, the profile
is based on twenty-five behavioral characteristics of airline passengers.5" In
the mid-1970s, the DEA began compiling traits commonly associated with
individuals engaged in the drug trade.54 From 1977 to 1982, the DEA's use
of the "drug courier profile" flourished in many airports.55 Additionally,
many local law enforcement agencies created modified versions based on lo-
calized traits of individuals involved in the drug trade in a given geographi-
cal area.
5 6
In United States v. Elmore, the Fifth Circuit developed what is now
known as the Elmore profile, which has gained widespread popularity with
enforcement agencies across the United States.5 7 This profile includes seven
primary characteristics: (1) arriving or departing from a known drug city;
(2) carrying large quantities of empty luggage, or carrying little or no lug-
gage; (3) traveling by an unusual itinerary; (4) traveling under a name other
than one's own; (5) carrying unusually large amounts of cash; (6) purchas-
ing an airline ticket with cash, particularly in small denomination currency;
and (7) displaying nervous or hurried behavior.58
investigatory searches and seizures. The Court has little interest in constitutional checks on
police discretion." Maclin, supra note 6, at 1317.
50. See supra note 40. See also infra note 61 (listing profile traits).
51. Farmer, supra note 4, at 412.
52. Id.
53. Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected that Th' Infected
Spy, as all Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye," 65 N.C. L. REV. 417, 423 n.45 (1987).
54. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 562 (1980). See also infra note 61 (listing
profile traits relied on by the Court).
55. Farmer, supra note 4, at 413.
56. Id. See also Becton, supra note 53, at 433.
57. 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). DEA agent Paul
Markonni is credited with developing this, the first drug courier profile. Id. at 1039 n.3.
58. Id. Four secondary characteristics are: (1) using public transportation (i.e., taxicabs)
to leave the airport, (2) using a public phone immediately after deplaning, (3) providing the
airline with a fictitious call-back number, and (4) traveling to source cities with unusual fre-
quency. Id. See Farmer, supra note 4, at 414. The DEA agents who detained Elmore had
their suspicions roused by the defendant's arrival from a source city, his use of an alias, his
purchase of his airline ticket with cash, and his one-day stay-over in Detroit. Elmore, 595 F.2d
at 1038-40. A "source city" is a city from which drug dealers ship illegal drugs to other
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Subsequent to the creation of the Elmore profile, the Supreme Court heard
several profile cases. 9 These decisions, however, only led to confusion sur-
rounding law enforcement's use of the profile.' While the Court never cited
the Elmore profile in its holdings, at least four of the characteristics were
found in each case. 6' In United States v. Mendenhall,62 the Court applied
the principles of Terry to the DEA's use of its drug courier profile and held
that the agents' use of a profile did not invalidate the investigatory stop.63 In
Mendenhall, law enforcement agents stopped the defendant as she was de-
parting from her flight at Detroit Metropolitan Airport." The agents used
the DEA's drug courier profile in determining that Mendenhall warranted
locations for further distribution or sale to individuals. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41
(1980) (per curiam). See Sean W. Bezark, Note, Gold Chains, Jumpsuits and Hunches: The
Use of Drug Courier Profiles After United States v. Sokolow, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J., 193, 200
(1989) (outlining the generally accepted profile characteristics); Farmer, supra note 4, at 414
(discussing common profile traits).
59. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that the agents had reasonable
suspicion when they stopped the defendant); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (holding
that the agents did not have reasonable suspicion when they stopped the defendant); Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (holding the profile characteristics that the agents relied on to be
indicative of nothing more than innocent travel); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980) (holding that the agents' use of a profile did not invalidate the investigatory stop).
60. Unless the Supreme Court creates a clearly defined set of profile characteristics, the
courts will have to follow "a case-by-case analysis to determine ... reasonable suspicion, ...
thereby adding to the already confusing past of the profile." Farmer, supra note 4, at 420.
61. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 n.1 (focusing on four Elmore profile traits: (1) de-
fendant's arrival from a source city; (2) defendant's nervous appearance; (3) defendant's fail-
ure to claim any luggage; and (4) defendant's change of airlines for her return flight); Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (using the same four characteristics focused on in Menden-
hall); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 n.2 (1983) (focusing on defendant's: (1) nervous
appearance; (2) payment for ticket in cash with small bills; (3) use of alias on airline identifi-
cation tag; (4) defendant's casual dress; (5) agent's assessment of defendant's age as between
25-35 years old; and (6) defendant's use of sturdy luggage); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 3-4 (1989) (focusing on defendant's: (1) payment for ticket in cash with small bills;
(2) travel under an alias; (3) traveling to a source city; (4) nervous appearance; (5) short time
spent at destination (48 hours); (6) failure to check any luggage).
62. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
63. Id. at 551. Justice Stewart, citing Terry, concluded that the Constitution does not
prevent law enforcement officials from addressing questions to anyone on the street. Id. at
554-55. Thus, officers using drug courier profiles could approach an individual and ask ques-
tions without triggering the Fourth Amendment. See also Maclin, supra note 6, at 1273 (dis-
cussing the nature of an investigatory stop).
64. Experience supported the DEA's conclusion that considerable drug traffic flows
through Detroit Airport. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 n. 1. Justice Powell, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, warned, however, that these statistics alone do not establish
the reasonableness of the search at issue, "[n]or would reliance upon the 'drug courier profile'
necessarily demonstrate reasonable suspicion." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 565 n.6. Each case
raising a Fourth Amendment issue must be judged on its own facts. Id.
1992]
Catholic University Law Review
further investigation, and then subsequently arrested her for drug
possession."
The majority in Mendenhall concluded that a seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment occurs when, given all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident, a reasonable person would not have believed that he
was free to leave.66 Factors that constitute the "totality of the circum-
stances" include the threatening presence of several officers, the use or dis-
play of a weapon by an officer, any physical touching of the person, or an
officer's use of language or tone of voice which indicates that the citizen's
compliance with an officer's request might be compelled. 67 Any consent
given by the individual to law enforcement officials must be voluntary.68
The individual's refusal to stop or to answer questions does not, in and of
itself, provide the law enforcement official with a basis which will support
even a temporary seizure of the individual. 69 The Mendenhall Court found
nothing in the record to indicate that based on the "totality of the circum-
stances," the defendant could not reasonably believe that she was free to
walk away.7 ° The Court also found that the defendant freely and voluntarily
65. The DEA agent testifying at trial stated that Mendenhall's behavior fit the DEA drug
courier profile. Id. at 547 n. 1. In this case, the agents thought it relevant that:
(1) the respondent was arriving on a flight from Los Angeles, a city believed by the
agents to be the place of origin for much of the heroin brought to Detroit; (2) the
respondent was the last person to leave the plane, 'appeared to be very nervous,' and
Icompletely scanned the whole area where [the agents] were standing;' (3) after leav-
ing the plane the respondent proceeded past the baggage area without claiming any
luggage; and (4) the respondent changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit.
Id. at 547 n. I (alteration in original).
66. Id. at 554. See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 n.6 (1979) (explaining a
number of factors, including display of a weapon or physical touching by an officer, which
would indicate to a reasonable person that they are not free to leave).
67. Id. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (holding that not all personal
intercourse between law enforcement officials and individuals constitutes a "seizure" under the
Fourth Amendment, but rather, only when the officer, "by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure'
has occurred").
68. In deciding this issue, the Court looked to see whether the consent was in fact volun-
tary, or the product of express or implied duress or coercion by law enforcement officials. Id.
at 554.
69. In the absence of voluntary consent, the individual "may not be detained even mo-
mentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
498 (1982). The government must prove that the defendant consented voluntarily rather than
as a result of express or implied coercion. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-27
(1973).
70. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555. The Court noted that the encounter took place in a
public area, the agents were plainclothed and displayed no weapons, and approached the de-
fendant as opposed to summoning her. In addition, the agents requested but did not demand
the defendant's identification and tickets. Id.
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consented to follow the officers to the DEA office.7' Based on these findings,
the Mendenhall Court held that the officers' actions did not violate the de-
fendant's Fourth Amendment rights.72
One month after Mendenhall, the Court found the use of drug courier
profiles unreliable in determining reasonable suspicion.7 3 In Reid v. Georgia,
the defendant was initially stopped as a result of a law enforcement officer's
use of a drug courier profile.74 The officers noted that Reid had arrived from
Fort Lauderdale, a source city, carrying no luggage, and had attempted to
conceal that he was traveling with a companion.75 After showing the officers
their personal identification and initially consenting to follow the officers to
the airport DEA office, Reid's companion fled, abandoning his shoulder bag
which was found to contain cocaine. 76 The Reid Court recognized that most
of the characteristics used to create the DEA profile could also be used to
describe presumably innocent travelers,77 and therefore, could not be relied
upon to establish an objective foundation of reasonable suspicion.7' The
Court concluded that the cocaine was the product of an illegal search and
that the trial court had properly granted Reid's motion to suppress the
cocaine.7 9
Three years later in Florida v. Royer,8" the Court added additional guide-
lines that law enforcement officials must follow when determining whether
there is reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect.81 In Royer, the defendant
71. Id. at 555, 557-58.
72. The Court concluded that the defendant consented to the search "freely and volunta-
rily" and therefore her Fourth Amendment protections were not triggered by the encounter
with the agents. Id. at 559-60.
73. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam).
74. Id. at 440. The Reid Court held that the drug courier profile used by the agents did
not provide a sufficient foundation for the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion that
the individual was engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 441. See supra note 61 (describing the
four profile characteristics relied on by the agents). See Farmer, supra note 4, at 415 (discuss-
ing Reid).
75. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
76. Id.
77. The Reid Court recognized that the defendant's attempt to conceal that he was travel-
ing with another person was suspicious, but was insufficient to support the seizure. Id at 441.
See Bezark, supra note 58, at 202 (explaining how the Reid Court recognized that "although
the characteristic of concealing the fact of traveling with another person was quite suspicious,
that characteristic by itself was 'too slender a reed to support the seizure' " (quoting Reid, 448
U.S. at 441)).
78. An individual's conformity with four of the characteristics set forth in a drug courier
profile will not support a seizure of the individual. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
79. Id. at 441-42.
80. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
81. Id. at 493 n.2. The Court added two profile characteristics to the four relied on in
Reid: (1) the defendant's payment for his ticket in cash; and that (2) the defendant's age
being between 25-35 years. Id. See supra notes 58-61.
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purchased a one-way airline ticket from Miami to New York City.82 The
detectives observing Royer, believed that his characteristics fit the DEA's
drug courier profile.8 3 As the defendant proceeded through the concourse
area leading to the airline boarding area, he was approached by two detec-
tives.8 4 Royer presented his airline ticket and driver's license upon the of-
ficers' request, but without verbally consenting.8 5 After preliminary
questioning and at the detective's request, Royer was lead to a small room
adjacent to the concourse area.8 6 After further questioning, the officers
opened Royer's suitcase, found marijuana, and arrested him. 7 Approxi-
mately fifteen minutes elapsed from the time the detectives initially ap-
proached Royer until his arrest.8 8
Justice White, writing for the Royer plurality, stressed the need for con-
sent to search Royer's suitcase.8 9 The Court noted that where the validity of
a search rests on the purported consent of the individual, the State must
prove that the requisite consent was freely and voluntarily given.9" If, upon
being approached by a law enforcement officer, an individual is willing to
listen to the officer or voluntarily answer questions put to him by an officer,
no Fourth Amendment protections have been violated.9 1 Nevertheless, the
Court stated that the police may not detain an individual who is subject to
82. Id. at 493. In addition, Royer also checked two suitcases, placing an identification tag
bearing the name "Holt" on each of the suitcases. Id. at 493.
83. The "drug courier profile" as applied in Royer included the following factors: Royer
was (a) carrying unusually heavy American Tourister luggage; (b) young, apparently between
the ages of 25-35; (c) casually dressed; (d) appeared nervous, "looking around at other peo-
ple;" (e) paid for his airline ticket in cash; and (f) only wrote a name and the destination on
the airline identification tag. Id. at 493 n.2.
84. Detectives Johnson and Magdalena were in plainclothes while on duty at the Miami
International Airport. Both detectives were with the Public Safety Department of Dade
County, Florida and were assigned to the County's Organized Crime Bureau, Narcotics Inves-
tigation Section. Id. at 493.
85. The airline ticket, like the baggage identification tags, bore the name "Holt," while the
driver's license which Royer produced bore Royer's correct name. Id. at 494.
86. Johnson and Magdalena did not return Royer's airline ticket and driver's license prior
to escorting him to a room forty feet away. Id.
87. Id. Royer did not orally respond to the detectives' request to open the suitcase, but
did produce a key and proceeded to unlock the suitcase. One of the detectives then opened it
without seeking further assent from Royer. Id. at 494-95.
88. Id. at 495.
89. Id. at 497.
90. "[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden
that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority." Id.
91. The police "do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individ-
ual on the street or in another public place" to ask him questions, so long as the individual
voluntarily consents to listen and respond. Id. See United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 133
(7th Cir. 1982) (outlining the three categories of judicially defined encounters between police
officers and citizens), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983).
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the encounter arising from the agent's use of the drug courier profile even
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds established by the of-
ficer.92 Furthermore, an individual's refusal to stop his forward progress, to
listen to questions, or to answer those questions does not, without other in-
dependent factors, furnish the grounds for a Terry stop.9 3
In considering the governmental interest required to support a temporary
seizure of an individual,94 the Royer Court grafted the specific facts and cir-
cumstances of the case onto the general guidelines set forth in the Terry
limited exception.95 The Royer Court considered several factors,96 and con-
cluded that Royer had indeed been effectively "seized." 97
Another recent drug courier profile case, United States v. Sokolow,98
"marked the first time the Court has taken a firm position on the issue [of
drug courier profiles]." 99 In Sokolow, the Supreme Court held that because
the agents established a foundation of reasonable suspicion that Sokolow was
transporting drugs independent of the profile, the agents' use of the DEA's
92. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498.
93. Id. See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556 (1980) (analogizing to the
Court's decision in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1979), where police officers arrested
the defendant for his failure to stop and answer the officers' questions).
94. The governmental interests involved include crime prevention and detection. Like-
wise, "the public has a compelling interest in identifying by all lawful means those who traffic
in illicit drugs for profit," Royer, 460 U.S. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring), and "it is this
interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly crimi-
nal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
95. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
881 (1975) (holding that "in appropriate circumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a prop-
erly limited 'search' or 'seizure' on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest or to
search for contraband or evidence of a crime"); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-49
(1972) (holding that an informant's report that an unnamed individual was carrying narcotics
and a gun presented a governmental interest sufficient to satisfy the Terry exception). These
cases illustrate the Court's individualized determination of the nature of the governmental
interest, balanced against the nature and quality of the intrusion upon the individual's Fourth
Amendment rights.
96. These factors included the officers identifying themselves as narcotic agents, informing
Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asking him to accompany them to
the police room in the airport terminal, thereby exercising some degree of control over his
person. Royer, 460 U.S. at 502. In addition, the officers had in their possession Royer's ticket,
identification, and his seized luggage. The agents never informed Royer that he was free to
board the plane if he so chose. Therefore, Royer could reasonably believe he was being de-
tained. Id. at 503.
97. Id. While asking for and examining Royer's airline ticket and his driver's license were
no doubt permissible, the combination of these and other factors amounted to a seizure. Id. at
501.
98. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
99. Farmer, supra note 4, at 418.
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profile did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment protections. 1°°
The defendant, returning to Hawaii from a three day trip to Miami, was
stopped by DEA agents at Honolulu Airport.1 °1 The agents compared
Sokolow's behavioral characteristics to the DEA profile.12 These charac-
teristics included Sokolow's purchase of his airline tickets with $2,100 in
cash, his use of an alias, his destination, his plan to stay in Miami for only
forty-eight hours, the fact that he did not check any luggage, and his black
jumpsuit, gold jewelry and nervous appearance.
10 3
The Sokolow Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit's holding that the agent's
stop was impermissible, 1" noted at the outset that the agents did not need to
establish probable cause in order to stop Sokolow for investigative pur-
poses.'O Rather, law enforcement officials need only demonstrate a basis of
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts: that criminal activity
may be afoot. 1o6 In determining reasonable suspicion, the Court focused on
the totality of the circumstances at hand, and noted that any one factor set
forth in the DEA's profile, by itself, is not dispositive proof of illegal con-
duct, 10 7 but may amount to reasonable suspicion when considered together
100. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 3. The Court held that the agents' use of the DEA profile did
not detract from the trained agent's analysis of the evidentiary factors. Id. at 10.
101. Id. at 4. Sokolow purchased two round-trip tickets from United Airlines. The tickets
were purchased in the names of "Andrew Kray" and "Janet Norian" and both tickets had
open return dates. Id. at 4.
102. Id. at 4-5.
103. Id. at 4. Sokolow payed the $2,100 in cash from a roll of twenty-dollar bills contain-
ing nearly twice that amount of cash. Id. The ticket agent at the United Airlines counter
noted that Sokolow was dressed in a black jumpsuit, wore gold jewelry and appeared nervous.
Id. In addition, neither Sokolow nor Janet Norian checked any luggage when they purchased
the tickets. Id. at 4.
104. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
105. Id. at 1417. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
DEA agents did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the initial stop. Id. at 1423. The
majority divided the facts bearing on reasonable suspicion into two categories. The first cate-
gory included characteristics indicating "ongoing criminal activity," such as the use of an alias
or evasive movement while moving through the airport. Id. at 1419. The majority required
that at least one characteristic in this category be met in order to support a finding of reason-
able suspicion. Id. The second category, "personal characteristics," included such factors as
cash payment for tickets, a short trip to a major drug city, nervousness, type of attire and the
absence of checked luggage. Id. at 1420. The majority believed these characteristics to be
relevant only if there was evidence of ongoing criminal behavior as set forth in the first cate-
gory. Id. Applying its two-part test, the majority found no evidence of ongoing criminal be-
havior to support Sokolow's demonstrated personal characteristics. Id. at 1422-23. Further,
the court went on to note that the characteristics exhibited by Sokolow could be shared by the
traveling public at large. Id. Thus, the court held the stop to be impermissible, and this, in
turn, rendered the agent's subsequent seizure of Sokolow impermissible. Id. at 1423.
106. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
107. Id. at 7-9.
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with other indicia of criminal activity." 8 Therefore, the Court accepted the
drug courier profile as an investigative tool, but qualified its use by requiring
that law enforcement agents demonstrate a basis of reasonable suspicion
founded upon several of the DEA profile characteristics before stopping the
suspect. 109
"Mendenhall, Reid and Royer failed to provide the lower courts with any
conclusive test as to the validity of drug courier profiles as an investigative
tool."" 0  The lack of substantive guidelines led to inconsistent interpreta-
tions of the drug courier profile. 11' The Court's decision in Sokolow "2 re-
sulted in the acceptance of profiles as an investigative tool.113 Now,
however, broad discretion as to the existence of reasonable suspicion is
placed in the hands of the officer on the street, and inconsistent interpreta-
tions of the drug courier profile flourish." 4
II. PROFILES-CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT: THE FEDERAL COURTS'
ACCEPTANCE OF DEA PROFILING TO PROVE REASONABLE
SUSPICION
The use of the DEA drug courier profile represents the threshold step in
the process by which an agent gains reasonable suspicion enabling him to
make an initial stop, which may lead to probable cause and the subsequent
arrest of illegal drug traffickers."' The case-specific information making up
the "totality of the circumstances" is, to a large extent, founded upon the
108. Id. at 8. The Court stated that "[a]ny one of these factors is not by itself proof of any
illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they
amount to reasonable suspicion." Id. at 9. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983)
(plurality opinion of Justice White); id. at 515-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 523-24
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9.
110. Bezark, supra note 58, at 202.
Ill. The Court's failure to provide substantive guidelines in Mendenhall, Reid and Royer
"left unanswered the basic question of what particular methods should (or should not) be used
by law enforcement officers when conducting a search or seizure." Farmer, supra note 4, at
409.
112. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
113. Id. at 9-11. See also Farmer, supra note 4, at 419 (citing the Court's reasoning in
Sokolow as "giv[ing] law enforcement officials the Court's blessing to use profiles as a valid
police tool").
114. Farmer, supra note 4, at 419.
115. A DEA agent's application of the profile with regard to a particular individual is the
first step in the agent's effort to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion basis to support a
subsequent stop. "It is perhaps arguable that simply matching the drug courier profile might
establish probable cause to search or at least reasonable suspicion to stop and question an
individual." Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Inno-
cent, 81 MIcH. L. REv., 1229, 1261-62 n.143 (1983).
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profile characteristics an agent uses in establishing reasonable suspicion.' 1 6
The acceptance by the lower courts of characteristics of the drug courier
profile to establish reasonable suspicion has been mixed and inconsist-
ent, with no clear delineation of a broadly accepted body of profile
characteristics.' 17
A. The Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Bradley,"' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit upheld the use of a drug courier profile by law enforcement
officials.' 19 The defendant, a twenty-four year old black female who was
eight months pregnant, was observed by DEA officials as she deplaned at
Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport after a direct flight from Los Ange-
les. 20 The agents noted that Bradley was dressed in maternity pants, a long
T-shirt, a heavy denim jacket, and was carrying a purse and one bag.
121
After preliminary observations, the agents noted that Bradley "stopped and
looked around more than the usual harried passenger." '22 Based on these
observations, the agents confronted Bradley, identified themselves, and
asked to speak with her.123 After examining her airline ticket, the agents
"noticed a bulge in the front of her pants not caused by her late-term preg-
nancy" and asked her to submit to a search. 2 4 Bradley was arrested after
the search yielded a large quantity of cocaine. 2 5
116. DEA agents have come to rely on the drug courier profile as a means of establishing
the reasonale suspicion necessary to make a stop. "The profile ...is intended to establish
which air travelers are probably drug couriers, which is a specific factual determination, that
is, one concerning the sufficiency of suspicion regarding particular individuals." LaFave, supra
note 20, at 481.
117. The profile has received mixed acceptance by the appellate courts. "[One] reason the
drug courier profile has deservedly not received deference from the appellate courts is that the
profile fails to limit meaningfully the discretion of agents in the field ...." Id. at 482. Before
courts accept the drug courier profile as a valid and effective law enforcement tool, "they are
certainly obliged 'to require that the government provide satisfactory empirical evidence that
the profile is "valid" and actually "works." No such showing has been made.' " Id. at 481-82
(quoting Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and
Judicial Review ofInvestigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 873 (1985)).
118. 923 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1991).
119. Id. at 365.
120. Id. at 363. Bradley was ticketed on a roundtrip from Los Angeles to Texarkana, with
a return three days later. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 364.
123. Id. Bradley agreed to speak with the agents and permitted their examination of her
ticket. Id.
124. Id.
125. Upon the officer's request for identification, Bradley bent over to look through her
purse which she had placed on a chair. As Bradley leaned over, both officers noticed a bulge in
her waistband. Id. A nearby female agent was then summoned and Bradley was asked to
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The court found that based on the totality of the circumstances, the of-
ficers had a reasonable suspicion that Bradley was engaged in an illegal ac-
tivity."' The court hurdled over the requisite reasoning in support of the
officers' initial suspicion, discounting such factors as Bradley's race, age,
itinerary, and cash-paid ticket as being indicative of nothing more than inno-
cent travel. 127 The court went on to note that Bradley's hurried and watch-
ful behavior in the airport only suggested characteristics of an uncertain and
worried traveler trying to make a connection.' 12  The majority concluded
that the bulge in Bradley's pants and her lack of personal identification con-
stituted a sufficient basis to support the officers' suspicions, and the reason-
able suspicion for the resultant search.' 29 It is within the interstices of the
court's reasoning that the officers' use of the drug courier profile falls, effec-
tively removing it from court's analysis of the officers' actions.
B. The Sixth Circuit
In United States v. Taylor,130 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit rejected the use of profiling as a basis for reasonable suspicion.
In Taylor, the defendant, Eddie Louis Taylor, was arrested by plainclothed
officers of the Memphis Police Department at Memphis International Air-
port. 13' Having observed Taylor deplane a flight from Miami, the arresting
officers noted that Taylor, a middle-aged black man, appeared different from
the other passengers on that flight.' 32 The officers found Taylor's character-
submit to a search. Bradley requested that the search be conducted in the privacy of a rest-
room. Upon entering the restroom, Bradley attempted to flush the contents of the package,
which was later identified as cocaine, down the toilet. Id.
126. Id. at 365.
127. Id. The court concluded that "Bradley's race, age, itinerary, and cash-paid ticket
(with short round-trip as opposed to an open return), alone were not grounds to base a reason-
able suspicion that the she was anything other than an innocent traveler." Id. at 365. But see
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 n.2, 502 (1983) (stating that the defendant's age, cash
purchase of an airline ticket, pale and nervous appearance and partial completion of the airline
luggage identification tag were worthy of heightened suspicion).
128. Bradley, 923 F.2d at 365.
129. Id.
130. 917 F.2d 1402 (6th Cir. 1990).
131. The arresting officers were Sergeant Joe Eldridge, who led the investigation, Officer
Bonnie Bevel and Officer Forest Britt Roberts. Sergeant Elridge has been with the Memphis
Police Department for twenty-two years, yet at the time of the encounter with Taylor, he had
only been with the airport drug task force for six months. Id. at 1403, 1408.
132. Id. at 1403. Taylor was wearing dark slacks, a work shirt and a hat, while other
passengers were wearing business clothes and vacation attire. Id. See infra note 158. Taylor
was carrying a new designer travel bag, and was the only black person on the flight. Id. The
officers characterized Taylor as acting excited and constantly looking around while walking
briskly through the airport terminal. Id. See infra notes 200, 205.
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istics to be consistent with the DEA profile, 133 and concluded that he was
worthy of further investigation.' 34 One of the officers approached Taylor,
identified herself to the defendant, and asked him some preliminary ques-
tions concerning his destination and travel plans. 35 A subsequent search of
Taylor's bag yielded two packages of cocaine and resulted in Taylor's
arrest. '
36
The court held that the officers' actions toward Taylor constituted an un-
lawful seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.137 The Taylor
majority evaluated the factors that the officers considered in making the ini-
tial determination that Taylor was involved in illegal activity 138 and found
that the defendant's nervous and hurried behavior was the type of behavior
to be expected of travelers in an airport terminal. 139 As to Taylor's attire, "40
133. Id. at 1408. See supra note 11. See also part IB of the text and accompanying
footnotes.
134. The officers had no general information indicating that a drug courier might be on
that particular flight, and had not received any "tip" that Taylor was involved in drug traffick-
ing. Id. at 1403.
135. Id. at 1404. But see Bruce Montecalvo, Lemming-Like Assent, MANHATTAN LAW.,
May 1990, at 10 (explaining how police officers have testified that "[t]he few travelers who do
invoke their theoretical rights not to be searched are . . . immediately suspected of having
something to hide").
136. Taylor's bag contained two kilograms of cocaine, and the police found $1,000 in cash
hidden in his socks, pockets and wallet. Taylor, 917 F.2d at 1404.
137. Id. at 1412. The Court considered the officers' failure to inform Taylor during the
stop "that he did not have to cooperate and was free to withhold his consent" as a factor in
Taylor's reasonable belief, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he was not free to
leave. Id. at 1411. None of the officers informed Taylor that he was under no obligation to
speak or to allow them to search his bag. Id. Taylor, on the other hand, testified that "Ser-
geant Eldridge grabbed his arm, forced him back from the curb, shoved a police badge in his
face and ordered him to stop." Id. Taylor also noted that he saw Eldridge's gun on the
officer's right hip. Id. According to Eldridge, he approached Taylor in the airport parking lot,
identified himself, and ordered Taylor to stop so he could talk to him. Id. Generally, in
determining whether a suspect was in fact seized, or whether, based on an individual in the
suspect's position, he would have reasonably believed he was free to walk away, courts look to
see if the officer informed the suspect that he was not obligated to answer. See supra note 68,
69. Informing a suspect that he is not obligated to answer questions, however, is not constitu-
tionally required. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (holding that no
seizure occurred even though "the respondent was not expressly told by the agents that she
was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry"); United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484,
489 (2d Cir.) (stating that the agents' failure to inform the defendant that he had no duty to
respond to the preliminary questioning was not constitutional), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663
(1991).
138. See supra note 132.
139. Taylor, 917 F.2d at 1409. But see United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1017 (8th
Cir. 1990) (noting how defendant's hurried behavior while moving through the terminal
roused the agent's suspicions). See also infra note 200.
140. Taylor, 917 F.2d at 1409. The court found that a black man walking quickly through
an airport terminal should not raise the suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 1412.
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the court stated that no dress code exists for airline passengers.' 4 ' The court
found that based on the totality of the circumstances, Taylor did not believe
he was free to leave when the officers first approached him.' 4 2 While recog-
nizing law enforcement's need to wage an effective battle in the "war on
drugs,"' 14 3 the court refused to allow law enforcement officers to disregard
Fourth Amendment rights and to "subject individuals to random invasions
of their privacy""' in order to curtail illicit drug use in our society.' 45
C. The Seventh Circuit
In United States v. Johnson,'46 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld the use of drug courier profiling.' 47 In Johnson, the defendant
arrived at Union Station in Chicago aboard an Amtrak train she had
boarded in Los Angeles.' 4 8 As she moved through the terminal, Johnson
was stopped by two officers of the Chicago police department. 4 9 The of-
ficers used a drug courier profile in determining that Johnson warranted fur-
141. Id. at 1409.
142. Id.
143. President Reagan's "War on Drugs" harnessed "a preexisting momentum" for an
effective government response to the ever-increasing drug trade. Wisotsky, supra note 1, at
891. In addition to widespread popular support, pressures from within the government had
been building for some time, with "[t]he Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime...
recommend[ing] 'an unequivocal commitment to combating international and domestic drug
traffic.'" Id. (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL RE-
PORT 28 (1981)).
144. Taylor, 917 F.2d at 1405. The court concluded that Taylor was not simply tapped on
the shoulder, but was grabbed forcefully, that the officers surrounded Taylor, that the officers
presented a 'threatening presence,' and that Taylor did not flee or escape, but answered the
officer's questions because he felt compelled to do so. Id. at 1406 (quoting United States v.
Mendenhall, 466 U.S 544, 544 (1980)). In support of Fourth Amendment protections, the
Sixth Circuit referred to its decision in United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1990), in
which it held that, in spite of the urgent need to address the plague of illegal drug importation
that has besieged this nation, the "Constitution remains a lodestar for the protections that shall
endure the most pernicious affronts to our society." Id. at 361. The Radka majority con-
cluded that "[t]he drug crisis does not license the aggrandizement of governmental power in
lieu of civil liberties." Id.
145. The Court concluded that "[a]lthough we recognize the importance of curtailing illicit
drug use in our society, the 'War on Drugs' can never license law enforcement officials to
disregard the rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment of our Constitution." Taylor, 917
F.2d at 1412.
146. 910 F.2d 1506 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 764 (1991).
147. Id. at 1509-10.
148. Id. at 1506. Johnson was looking about for her fiance when the officers first noticed
her. When she did not see her fiance, she went to a public telephone and called him, asking if
he could pick her up. Id. at 1506-07.
149. Id. at 1507. The two officers were Richard Boyle of the Chicago Police Department,
assigned to the DEA Task Force at Union Station, and Amtrak policeman Robert Suave. Id.
Boyle was a twenty-two year veteran of the Chicago Police Department, spending the last
seven years in drug interdiction. Id.
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ther investigation.' 5 ° Subsequently, Johnson was arrested after police
uncovered a kilogram of cocaine from Johnson's attache case."'
The Johnson court turned to the three basic categories of police-citizen
interactions to determine the appropriate standard for the court's subsequent
analysis: the arrest, the investigatory stop and the contact.' 52 The Johnson
majority found that based on the "totality of the circumstances," Johnson
could have reasonably believed that she was free to walk away from the
officer's questioning.' 53 As to the officers' initial suspicion that Johnson was
involved in illegal activity, the court afforded great weight to such factors as
Johnson's arrival from Los Angeles, her nervous and hurried behavior while
in the station and her cash-paid ticket. 54 Based on these and other factors,
the court upheld the officer's finding of reasonable suspicion that Johnson
was involved in an illegal activity.'
55
150. Id. The officers used a computer printout of information about passengers on the
train from Los Angeles. Boyle learned from the printout that Johnson had purchased a one-
way ticket for $453 in cash. Id. After the officers identified themselves and asked several
preliminary questions including a request to search her handbag, Johnson refused to consent to
the search or to any further questioning and walked fifteen feet to a public telephone to call her
attorney. Id. At that point the officers stopped Johnson and grabbed her purse, suitcase and
handbag. A subsequent search aided by a drug sniffing dog, uncovered a kilogram of cocaine.
Id.
151. Id. at 1507-08.
152. Id. at 1508. See also United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1982) (setting
forth the categories for police-citizen interaction in relation to the Fourth Amendment), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983). For a valid arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires that the
police have probable cause to believe a person is committing or has just completed the commis-
sion of a crime. Johnson, 910 F.2d at 1508. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91-92 (1964)
(holding that law enforcement officials need probable cause to make an arrest). An investiga-
tory stop is limited to a brief, non-intrusive detention. Johnson, 910 F.2d at 1508. Under the
Fourth Amendment, this category of interaction qualifies as a "seizure," but the officer need
only have "specific and articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a
person has committed or is committing a crime." Id. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975) (holding that the officer must have a basis of specific and articul-
able facts to support a finding of reasonable suspicion). The third category, contact, does not
qualify as a "seizure" because the nature and quality of the interaction involves no restraint on
the citizen's liberty. Johnson, 910 F.2d at 1508. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 553-55 (1982) (holding that a person is seized only when his freedom of movement is
restrained by a show of authority or physical force). This type of interaction is most frequently
characterized by an officer seeking the citizen's voluntary cooperation through non-coercive
questioning. Johnson, 910 F.2d at 1508.
153. Johnson, 910 F.2d at 1508-10.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1510.
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D. The Second Circuit
In United States v. Lee,' 56 the Second Circuit addressed the use of investi-
gative stop by law enforcement officials using the drug courier profiles. 1'7 In
Lee, law enforcement officials observed the defendant as he purchased an
airline ticket at Buffalo International Airport. 8 One uniformed officer
noted that Lee appeared nervous and would not engage in direct eye con-
tact. 159 Other factors which the officer noticed included Lee's traveling to
Tampa, Florida, his payment for the airline ticket in cash, and his carrying
of what appeared to be an empty suitcase. 160 When Lee returned from Flor-
ida the next day, he was stopped by DEA agents, questioned, and after a
search of his bag, he was arrested.
16 1
In concluding that the nature and quality of the agent's interaction with
Lee did not meet the requisite level of intrusiveness for a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 162 the majority touched on various as-
pects of a police-citizen interaction which bear on the individual's perception
of his ability to walk away from the officers and return to answer their ques-
tions. 16  The court considered several factors in determining whether the
circumstances constituted a seizure: the threatening presence of several of-
156. 916 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1990).
157. The court noted that a police officer is free to approach an individual in a public place
and put questions to him, and that such conduct, without more, does not constitute a seizure.
Id. at 819. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (holding that law enforcement
officials do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual and ask-
ing him questions, as the person need not answer any of the questions put to him, and may go
on his way if he so chooses). An individual can only be seized by police when, in view of all
the attendant circumstances, a reasonable person would believe they were not free to walk
away from the questioning. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (citing United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
158. Lee, 916 F.2d at 816. Officer Gerace, the same officer who made the stop in Hooper,
observed Lee at the ticket counter wearing a black sweater, black woolen slacks and a three-
quarter length black leather coat. Id. But see United States v. Flowers, 909 F.2d 145, 146 (6th
Cir. 1990) (explaining that defendant wore a loose-fitting sweatshirt and denim jacket that
gave rise to agent's heightened suspicion); United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1015 (8th
Cir. 1990) (explaining that a defendant wearing brown leather aviator jacket, gold chain and
hair down to shoulders gave rise to agent's heightened suspicion).
159. Lee, 916 F.2d at 816. Lee appeared nervous and continually stared at the uniformed
Officer Gerace, but whenever Gerace looked directly at Lee, Lee averted his eyes. Id.
160. Id. Lee paid the $410 roundtrip fare to Tampa, Florida, in $10 bills. The ticket was
purchased under the name "B. Jackson." Id.
161. Id. When Lee deplaned in Buffalo, he was wearing the same clothes he had on when
he left for Tampa one and one-half days earlier. Lee was no longer carrying the maroon
suitcase he had on his person when he left, but rather, he was toting a brown paper shopping
bag. Id.
162. Id. at 819.
163. The court noted that the only factor which might arguably be construed as an indica-
tion that Lee was not free to leave was one officer's statement that Lee was suspected of carry-
ing contraband. Id.
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ficers; the display of a weapon by an officer; the physical touching of the
individual by an officer; any language or tone used by the officer which
would support the individual's reasonable belief that he was not free to walk
away; and any prolonged retention of the personal effects of the individual
such as airline tickets or personal identification. 16 4 The Second Circuit con-
cluded that the effect of these factors, when taken together, would not pre-
clude a reasonable man from thinking that he was free to leave.,
65
The court noted that the officers did not display their weapons in a threat-
ening manner toward Lee, made no show of force, and did not threaten Lee
in their conversation with him. The court determined that the officers' re-
quest that Lee move to a less congested area was motivated only by a desire
to move out of the flow of pedestrian traffic.166 In addition, after examining
Lee's driver's license and airline tickets, the officers promptly returned them
to Lee. 167 In light of these facts, the court concluded that the encounter
between Lee and the agents was consensual.
16 8
The Second Circuit's recent treatment of drug courier profiling is set forth
in United States v. Hooper.169 On May 15, 1989, Daniel Allman, an agent
with the United States Border Patrol, and Thomas Gerace, an officer with
the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 7 ° were on duty in plain
clothes at Buffalo International Airport.' Using the DEA profile, the
agents scrutinized deplaning passengers to determine whether any of their
164. Id.
165. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that only two of the four officers present
actually approached Lee, the encounter took place in a public area, the officers were not in
uniform, the officers displayed no weapons, and there was no show of force or physical touch-
ing. Id. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded there was no seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980) (finding that the officers did not use threats or show of force when the defend-
ant consented to the search).
166. Lee, 916 F.2d at 819. This is similiar to the Second Circuit's treatment of an officer's
request that the defendant move to another part of the concourse. In United States v. Hooper,
935 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663 (1991), the court viewed the motivation
behind an agent's request to move as merely an effort to avoid impeding the flow of pedestrian
traffic moving through the airport. Id. at 487.
167. Lee, 916 F.2d at 819.
168. Id. at 819-20.
169. 935 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663 (1991).
170. Agent Gerace, the officer who stopped the defendant in Lee, and agent Allman re-
ceived, as part of their training, instruction as to characteristics which experience has shown to
indicate an individual's involvement in drug trafficking. These characteristics, taken cumula-
tively, constitute the drug courier profile used in the instant case. Id. at 487.
171. Both agents had been "assigned to a DEA task force that enforces immigration, drug,
and currency laws at the airport and at other Buffalo transportation centers." Id. As part of
their training, agents on the task force were "familiarized with certain characteristics that
constitute a profile of persons that may be engaged in illicit narcotics activity." Id.
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characteristics matched those of the profile.' 7 2 At approximately 4:25 p.m.,
Agents Gerace and Allman were watching passengers from United Airlines
Flight 948, which originated in Oakland, California, a source city, 173 and
terminated in Buffalo, New York, with one stop-over in Chicago.' 74 In ad-
dition to his flight from a source city, Hooper did not have any carry-on
luggage, traveled alone, and was one of the last passengers to leave the
plane. 1
75
Based on their preliminary observations, Gerace and Allman decided that
Hooper warranted a greater degree of scrutiny and began to follow him
through the airport terminal. 176 Hooper was "looking from side to side" as
he entered the concourse area. 1 77 Hooper then entered a video game room,
stayed for approximately two minutes, but did not play any games.
178
Hooper then left the game room, headed for an escalator, but then stopped
at a public telephone. 179 Gerace and Allman followed Hooper down the
escalator to the lower level of the airport, where Hooper "retrieved a green
hard shell bag that was wrapped in airline tape" from the United Airlines
baggage claim area. 181
As Hooper headed for the exit, Gerace and Allman approached him, iden-
tified themselves as DEA agents, displayed their identification, and asked if
they could speak with him.' 8 ' Hooper consented to speak with the
agents. 182 After initial questioning, Gerace informed Hooper that the agents
were "concerned with narcotics coming through the airport and asked
Hooper if he could look in his suitcase."' 18 3 Hooper responded that he did
172. Id.
173. Id. See supra note 58, 61.





179. Hooper stayed at the phones for approximately one minute and "appeared to retrieve
change from the telephone," indicating to the agents that he was unsuccessful in completing
his call. Id. See Farmer, supra note 4, at 414 n.65.
180. Hooper, 935 F.2d at 487.
181. Id.
182. Hooper "indicated his assent by saying either 'yes' or 'okay.' At Gerace's suggestion,
they moved to a less congested area so that they would not disrupt the pedestrian traffic exiting
and entering the airport." Id.
183. Id. at 488. Gerace asked Hooper where he was coming from and requested to see his
airline ticket. The ticket which Hooper handed to Gerace was a one-way airline ticket that
had been paid for, in cash, that morning in Oakland, California. The price of the ticket was in
excess of $500, and it had been purchased in the name of "Kenny Fields." Id. Hooper had
originally told the officers that his name was Kenny Fields. The name "Kenny Fields" also
appeared on the identification tag attached to the suitcase which Hooper was carrying. When
Gerace asked Hooper for identification, Hooper stated that he had none. When asked about
his place of residence, Hooper responded that he lived in Buffalo. Hooper informed Allman
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not have a key. 184 After further questioning concerning the ownership of
the bag,' 85 Gerace informed Hooper that he would seize the suitcase and
obtain a search warrant. 8 6 After following Gerace and Allman to the air-
port DEA office to obtain a receipt for the bag, Hooper proceeded to the taxi
stand and left the airport. 187 The following day, after a search of the suit-
case yielded a cache of illegal drugs, an arrest warrant was issued for
Hooper's arrest. Hooper was finally arrested several months later, and was
charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute along with a
related weapons charge.'
The Second Circuit sketched an overview of characteristics attributed to
Hooper which were commensurate with the DEA profile.'8 9 A majority of
the Second Circuit treated Hooper's arrival from a "source city" as the first
profile characteristic giving rise to the agents' heightened suspicion.' 9° The
fact that Hooper was the last to deplane was the second "specific and articul-
able" characteristic that aroused the agents' suspicions.' Another such
characteristic was Hooper's choice to travel alone.'92 The court found that
based on the agents' testimony, individuals traveling alone were in keeping
with the characteristics of those engaged in illegal activity pursuant to the
DEA profile, and this factor could be used in a "totality of the circum-
stances" determination by law enforcement officials in their formation of
that he was born in 1930 or 1931, which would have put his age at 58 or 59. Hooper then
recanted and produced a birth date which more closely corresponded to his actual age of 19.
Id. at 487-88.
184. Id. at 488. Gerace asked Hooper if he owned the bag. Hooper responded that it was
not his bag, although some of his possessions were inside. Id. at 488.
185. In response to Gerace's continued questioning, "Hooper stated that 'his people' had
put 'stuff' in the suitcase." Id. Gerace asked Hooper who "his people" were. After asking
whether he was obligated to answer that question, Gerace informed Hooper that he was not
obligated to answer any further questions, yet Gerace went on to question Hooper as to the
whereabouts of the key for the suitcase. Hooper stated that one key was in Chicago and one
key was in Buffalo. Id. Gerace suggested that the suitcase be run through a magnetometer, a
device used by airport security to detect guns and other metal objects in luggage. Hooper, who
appeared to be nervous at the suggestion, refused. At this point approximately five minutes
had elapsed from the time the agents initially approached Hooper. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. Hooper followed Gerace and Allman to the DEA office. Once there, Hooper gave
the agents the address and telephone number of where he was staying, and the agents gave
Hooper a receipt for the suitcase which contained the address and telephone number of the
DEA office. The agents then informed Hooper that he could leave. Id.
188. Id. at 489.
189. Id. at 487.
190. Id. at 493-94.
191. Id. at 487. The majority seized upon the agents' testimony concerning this aspect of
the profile, with little reflection as to its true probative value or the existence of any inconsis-
tent holdings on this point in other decisions. See infra part III.
192. Id. at 487.
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reasonable suspicion.193 The fourth "specific and articulable" factor was
Hooper's lack of luggage. 194 According to the agent's testimony, the ab-
sence of luggage on Hooper's person as he deplaned heightened their suspi-
cion. 195 The majority concluded that in keeping with the characteristics set
forth in the DEA profile, the absence of luggage warranted heightened
suspicion. 
196
The fifth "specific and articulable" factor considered by the court was
Hooper's general behavior. 97 Gerace and Allman testified to Hooper's
roundabout path through the airport terminal after deplaning. 98 The
agents noted that Hooper kept "looking from side to side," and that Hooper
proceeded to the airport game room where he stayed for approximately two
minutes, without playing any games.' 99 The majority accepted the agents'
interpretation of Hooper's behavior as consistent with the DEA profile, find-
ing Hooper's nervousness as a valid factor in the agents' "totality of the
circumstances" determination of reasonable suspicion.2"
III. INCONSISTENCIES SPAN THE CIRCUITS: INTERPRETATION OF DRUG
COURIER PROFILE FACTORS IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
The circuit courts' continued use of the drug courier profile to prove rea-
sonable suspicion has led to the inconsistent interpretation of profile charac-
teristics. Inconsistencies in the application and formulation of the drug
courier profile are most readily apparent when the factors that make up the
profile are analyzed, individually, across all circuits.2"'
One example of the inconsistency in the application of drug courier
profiles is the courts' interpretation of plane deboardings. The courts have




196. The Hooper court failed to reconcile this finding with any of the conflicting findings by
other courts concerning this aspect of the profile. See infra notes 219, 225; see also United
States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that the suspect's lack of luggage
could be listed as a characteristic profile trait). But see United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342,
343 (5th Cir. 1981) (viewing suspect's possession of a gym bag as a characteristic profile trait),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982).
197. Hooper, 935 F.2d at 487.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 490. See supra notes 105, 132, 139; see infra note 233; United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (discussing suspect's nervous appearance); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.
438, 441 (1980) (explaining how suspect appeared nervous). But see United States v. McKines,
933 F.2d 1412 (8th Cir.) (discussing suspect's unnatural calmness), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 593
(1991).
201. See supra notes 118, 130, 146, 169 and accompanying text. See infra part III. See also
infra notes 217-25, 243, 244.
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which an individual deplanes from a flight.2" 2 In United States v. Millan,2 °3
the defendant was one of the first to deplane. 2' There, the Eighth Circuit
held this characteristic to be in line with those set forth in the DEA pro-
file.2°5 In United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza,2 °6 on the other hand, the
defendant departed from the plane in the middle of the deplaning process.2 °7
The Second Circuit found this also to be characteristic of an individual in-
volved in drug trafficking activity.2"8 Finally, in United States v. Menden-
hall,209 the profile came full circle, with the Supreme Court finding the
agents' heightened suspicion warranted because the defendant was one of the
last passengers to depart from the plane.210
Recalling the United States federal court's recent articulation of the "spe-
cific and articulable" facts standard in United States v. Hooper,2 ' the de-
fendant was in a "no win" situation. Hooper was the last to deplane, but
perhaps Hooper had the unwitting misfortune of sitting at the rear of the
plane and was therefore left with no other choice than to simply wait his
turn. Based on other circuit holdings, it is apparent that changing Hooper's
seating arrangements on the plane would have been to no avail, for it ap-
pears that deplaning at any point during the procedure raises the suspicion
of law enforcement officials.
In Hooper, an individual traveling alone also indicated illegal activity
under the DEA's profile.212 Again, however, the circuits are in conflict on
this point.2 13 In United States v. Garcia,21 4 the First Circuit gave great
weight to the agents' testimony that their suspicions were aroused when they
202. See infra note 205.
203. 912 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1990).
204. Id. at 1015.
205. Id. See also United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding de-
fendant, as one of the first to deplane, gave rise to heightened suspicion), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1068 (1983). But see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980) (explaining
how the defendant being one of the last to deplane gave rise to heightened suspicion); United
States v. Sterling, 909 F.2d 1078, 1079 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant being one of the
last to deplane was in line with profile).
206. 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980).
207. Id. at 31.
208. Id.
209. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
210. Id. at 547 n.1.
211. 935 F.2d 484, 498 (2d Cir.) (supporting the agents' claim that they had reasonable
suspicion based on the profile characteristics and the defendant's responses to their questions),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663 (1991).
212. Hooper, 935 F.2d at 487.
213. The circuits have found that traveling alone and traveling with a companion are indic-
ative of illegal drug trafficking. See infra notes 215, 217.
214. 905 F.2d 557 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 522 (1990).
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observed the defendant traveling with a companion.21 5 In United States v.
White,2 16 the defendant was traveling alone. The Seventh Circuit found this
characteristic to be indicative of illegal activity. 2 7 Therefore, an individual
traveling alone--or with a companion--cannot be grounds for suspicion if
an agent's finding of reasonable suspicion is to comport with the Terry lim-
ited exception.
The Hooper court found the absence of any carry-on luggage to be another
factor pointing to illegal activity.2'" There is, however, a long line of incon-
sistent holdings concerning this aspect of the DEA profile. In Florida v.
Royer, 219 agents observed that the defendant carried American Tourister
luggage which "appeared to be heavy,",221 a characteristic they considered to
be within the profile.221 In United States v. Sanford,222 the defendant carried
a small gym bag. 223 The agents considered that to be a characteristic within
the profile and the Fourth Circuit agreed.224 Decisions which mention lug-
gage, or the lack thereof, carried by the defendant, span the entire spectrum
without consistency as to possible configurations, combinations, and descrip-
tions of luggage. 225 The Hooper court failed to provide any guidance, noting
215. Id. at 559. See also United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th Cir. 1980) (explain-
ing how defendant traveling with a companion was in line with the profile).
216. 890 F.2d 1413 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
217. Id. at 1415. See also United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883 (6th Cir. 1978) (where
defendant traveling alone gave rise to heightened suspicion).
218. United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663
(1991).
219. 460 U.S. 491, 493 (1983) (explaining that the American Tourister luggage that Royer
was carrying appeared to be heavy, and that this characteristic fit within the profile). Compare
with United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 1403 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the new de-
signer bag was a characteristic fitting the drug courier profile); United States v. Sullivan, 625
F.2d 9, 12 (4th Cir. 1980) (explaining that defendant's brand new luggage fit within the profile
and was, when viewed with other characteristics, worthy of heightened suspicion by the DEA
agents), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981).
220. Royer, 460 U.S. at 493 n.2.
221. Id.
222. 658 F.2d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982).
223. Id. at 343, 345.
224. Id.
225. Royer, 460 U.S. at 491 (finding defendant's carrying of American Tourister luggage,
which appeared to be heavy, to fit within the profile); Sanford, 658 F.2d at 343 (finding defend-
ant's carrying of a small gym bag to fit within the profile); United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d
1402, 1408-10 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding defendant's carrying brand new luggage to fit within the
profile). Even if the profile were to specifically deem the presence of luggage on the person of
the individual as indicative of drug trafficking activity, there is no consistency as to the type,
size, weight and appearance of the luggage. Id.
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only that Hooper was observed to have no luggage on his person and thus fit
within the profile.2 26
The courts also have treated an individual's nervousness while in the air-
port terminal in an inconsistent manner, with decisions indicating what
amounts to the entire range of human behavior as suggestive of illegal activ-
ity. In United States v. Millan,2 7 agents observed the defendant walking
rapidly through the airport terminal. 22' According to the Eighth Circuit,
this behavior warranted a heightened level of suspicion under the DEA pro-
file.229 In United States v. Gomez-Norena,23 ° the defendant appeared to walk
aimlessly through the airport terminal. 231  The Ninth Circuit found the
agent's testimony pertaining to the suspect's behavior in keeping with the
drug courier profile.23 2 In light of these decisions, the DEA's profile is in-
consistent even as to the most basic and outward aspects of an individual's
behavior. A similar line of cases covers the entire spectrum of an individ-
ual's outwardly manifested behavior, ranging from individuals who were
perceived as too nervous to those who were perceived as too calm.23 3 In
keeping with its treatment of other elements within the profile, the Hooper
majority failed to provide any substantive support for law enforcement's use
of the profile as a valid means of creating a sufficient level of suspicion.
2 11
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEA PROFILING: PROTECTION OF THE
PEOPLE OR INFRINGEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS?
Courts today feel increased pressure to provide the tools necessary to
wage an effective battle in the war on drugs. The result is inchoate if not
incoherent jurisprudence concerning Fourth Amendment principles at a
time when law enforcement and citizens need clearly defined substantive
guidelines. In addressing the use of the DEA profile by law enforcement
226. United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663
(1991). The court gave weight to the agents' testimony, listing the absence of luggage on
Hooper's person as he deplaned as one of the factors giving rise to heightened suspicion. Id.
227. 912 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1990).
228. Id. at 1017.
229. Id. See also United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1491 (6th Cir. 1989) (where de-
fendant walked rapidly through the airport).
230. 908 F.2d 497 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 363 (1990).
231. Id. at 498.
232. Id. at 497-98.
233. See United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412 (8th Cir.) (explaining how defendant
acted too calm), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 593 (1991); United States v. Cooke, 915 F.2d 250, 251
(6th Cir. 1990) (explaining how defendant acted too nervous).
234. See United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 489-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
663 (1991).
[Vol. 41:943
One Size Fits All
officials, the majority in Hooper painted only a one-sided picture.2 35 In fail-
ing to point out inconsistencies in the formulation and application of the
profile across a spectrum of varying fact patterns, the Second Circuit under-
mined the credibility and merit of the drug courier profile. The Second Cir-
cuit's profile is only consistent as to its documented inconsistencies: the
profile seems to encompass every possible characteristic that one can observe
a human being to possess or exhibit.23 6
The Second Circuit, in analyzing Hooper's stop under the limited excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment of Terry v. Ohio,2 37 upheld the agent's use of
the DEA profile.238 The majority based its decision on the Terry limited
seizure doctrine.2 39 In so doing, however, the Hooper majority effectively
undermined the "specific and articulable" language in the Terry "reasonable
suspicion" exception, which the Supreme Court intended as a safeguard
against unjustifiable intrusions on the Fourth Amendment rights of individu-
als by law enforcement officials. 2" Consistent with other circuits' interpre-
tation of the drug courier profile, the Second Circuit selectively incorporated
only the favorable facts, and defused those which were unfavorable.24 ' This
approach fosters inconsistent interpretations of the drug courier profile and
heightens the possibility of Fourth Amendment violations.24 2
235. Id. at 499-500 (Pratt, J., dissenting) (illustrating how the court failed to reconcile any
of the conflicting case law pertaining to characteristics outlined in the drug courier profile with
those exhibited by Hooper).
236. See supra part III.
237. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
238. Hooper, 935 F.2d at 493-94 (finding defendant's characteristics to be consistent with
the drug courier profile and acknowledging that although the agents drew inferences from the
profile, that "does not entitle those inferences to any greater or lesser weight in determining
whether there was reasonable suspicion"). Id. at 494.
239. Id. at 493. To justify a Terry stop, "a law enforcement officer must have 'a reasonable
suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be afoot."'" Id. See
supra part IA.
240. See supra note 38.
241. See United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663
(1991). See supra part III, notes 217-25 and accompanying text. The Hooper court defined
"source city" as "a city from which narcotics are transported to Buffalo." Id. at 487. The
Hooper court selectively incorporated this "specific and articulable" fact while omitting any
mention of the government's concession at oral argument that "a 'source city' for drug traffic
[is] virtually any city with a major airport." Id. at 499 (Pratt, J., dissenting). Judge Pratt, in
his dissent, noted that this concession "was met with deserved laughter in the courtroom." Id.
Characterizing every United States city with a major airport as a "source city" does little to
form a narrowly construed profile useful to establish reasonable suspicion consistent with
Terry.
242. See supra notes 196, 200, 205, 219, 234 and accompanying text.
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Hooper represents a growing trend of weakening Fourth Amendment pro-
tections against unreasonable search and seizure. 243 This trend is the result
of an effort by the courts to fashion what is perceived as the proper align-
ment of governmental power in relation to individual rights in light of soci-
ety's growing need and desire to fight the war on drugs. 2 "
The use of drug courier profiles by law enforcement officials may appear
as a benign, administrative matter when weighed against the evils of the
present day drug crisis.2 45 As a society, however, we must protect the fun-
damental Fourth Amendment values at stake with each new case.24 6 In
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,2 47 Justice Stewart asserted, "[i]n times of un-
rest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion,
this basic law [the Fourth Amendment] and the values that it represents may
appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the values were those of the
authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts. ' 248 As a society, we
243. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1989) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (expressing fear that officers' reliance on the drug courier profile detracts
from their ability to make an individualized determination of reasonable suspicion of any given
individual, thereby reducing the constitutional safeguards provided by the requisite particular-
ized probable cause for an arrest); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 512-13 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (recognizing the drug trade as a pressing national concern, but refused to excuse
the Court from its duty to strike down official conduct that exceeds the confines of the Consti-
tution); United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 500 (2d Cir.) (noting that of the 600 suspects
the agents detained in 1989, only 10 were arrested-the Fourth Amendment rights of 590
people were sacrificed in the process) (Pratt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663 (1991);
United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 1412 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the war on drugs
could never serve as a license for law enforcement officials to disregard an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights). See also Becton, supra note 53, at 430 (noting that law enforcement
agents can misuse drug courier profiles to support arbitrary decisions with "after-the-fact com-
pilations of characteristics suited to the individual detained by them," thereby giving the
agents "unchecked power to manipulate the predictive model"); Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 909
(finding that "[tjhe result of the War on Drugs is thus a gradual, but inexorable, expansion of
enforcement powers at the expense of personal freedoms")
244. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (recognizing that "[tihe
public has a compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly drugs for per-
sonal profit"); United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 1990) (recognizing "the
devastation wrought by drug trafficking in communities nationwide"); Royer, 460 U.S. at 513
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "the strength of society's interest in overcoming
the extraordinary obstacles to the detection of drug traffickers," found the agents' use of the
profile to establish the requisite particularized suspicion for an investigative stop). "Currently,
it is estimated that drug trafficing [sic] is a $110 billion a year business. The magnitude of the
problem is enormous." Bezark, supra note 58, at 203 n.80 (citing Watson, Can Bush Win the
Drug War?, CHICAGO SUN-TIMEs, February 15, 1990, at 39).
245. The emerging drug exception to the Fourth Amendment and the attendant "crack-
down attitude penetrate every aspect of the contemporary federal criminal justice system-
legislation, adjudication, investigation, and prosecution-it also reaches into lives of ordinary
people not accused of crime." Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 891.
246. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
247. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
248. Id. at 455.
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must not allow our need for effective law enforcement to overshadow our
fundamental Fourth Amendment protections. The DEA and other law
enforcement agencies must be limited to a profile that provides a basis of
specific and articulable facts that are in keeping with the carefully circum-
scribed reasonable suspicion exception in Terry.249 The profile must provide
substantive guidelines, thereby insuring the preservation of individual rights
under the Fourth Amendment.2 5 ° Currently, the DEA profile, in providing
a legal basis to stop a suspect, is formulated to be general in both its scope
and application. Unfortunately, the profile serves as a virtual panacea for
law enforcement officials in forming reasonable suspicion for a stop and
search.25'
Gerace and Allman, the agents who stopped the defendants in Hooper and
Lee, detained 600 suspects in 1989 using the drug courier profile. Of these
600 stops, only ten led to arrests, 252 resulting in the sacrifice of the Fourth
Amendment rights of 590 individuals.25 3 If these numbers are indicative of
the work of DEA agents using the profile at airports nationwide, the scale of
this wholesale infringement on individual rights becomes clear. In addition,
the courts see only the cases in which the investigative stop resulted in an
arrest, as the innocent "have little incentive to sue." 254 Few law enforce-
ment agencies keep statistics on "the percentage of such searches [that] turn
up evidence of a crime,",255 but "logic suggests the number of innocents put
on the spot by police dwarfs the number found to have drugs. ' 2 5 6 Former
Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall has noted that the nebulous defi-
nition of drug courier profiles results in inconsistent and arbitrary applica-
tions by law enforcement officials.257 With such a great degree of discretion
in the hands of the officer, judges may no longer have the power to provide
249. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). See supra notes 33-35, 39-41; infra note 261 and
accompanying text. See also United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499 (2d Cir.) (Pratt, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663 (1991).
250. Id. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-2.
251. Hooper, 935 F.2d at 499-500 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
252. Id. "It appears that they have sacrificed the fourth amendment by detaining 590 inno-
cent people in order to arrest ten who are not-all in the name of the 'war on drugs.' " Id.
253. Id.
254. Montecalvo, supra note 135, at 2.
255. Id.
256. Id. "Some federal courts have suggested that refusal to cooperate-when combined
with other 'suspicion' [sic] conduct such as walking fast, looking around 'nervously,' having no
checked luggage ... will create the kind of 'reasonable suspicion' necessary to justify tempo-
rary detention." Id.
257. Justice Marshall attributed such broad applications to "the profile's chameleon-like
way of adapting to any particular set of observations." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir.
1987)).
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independent oversight with respect to Fourth Amendment issues arising
from investigatory stops carried out by law enforcement officials. 258
In order to safeguard Fourth Amendment protections, the DEA profile
used by law enforcement officials as a tool to establish reasonable suspicion
must be narrowly defined in both its scope and application.259 Inconsisten-
cies must be purged so that agents may use the profile in an unarbitrary
manner to establish specific and articulable facts tending to show a suspect's
involvement in the drug trade.260  To create a uniform application, the
Supreme Court must draw on past case experience and formulate a drug
courier profile consisting of a set of characteristics that are clearly defined
and open to little interpretation by the officer applying the profile to an indi-
vidual, and must reconcile any approved profile with the spirit of the Terry
258. If law enforcement officials are allowed the wide degree of latitude that they have in
their use of drug courier profiles, "[tihe judge's role in the judicial process might dwindle from
one of an independent reviewer of fact to one of a monitor of investigatory formulas. This
outcome could result in a greater likelihood of pretext searches and discrimination by the law
enforcement community and, in turn, to a greater reduction in fourth amendment rights."
Farmer, supra note 4, at 419 (footnote omitted). "You are far more likely to be scooped into
the police net ... if you are black or hispanic." Montecalvo, supra note 135, at 2. See gener-
ally Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (warning of governmental encroachment
through the use of a broad, ambiguous profile which provides little in the way of substantive
guidelines in the formation of reasonable suspicion).
259. "By requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to [Sokolow's] seizure [ the
Fourth Amendment protects innocent persons from being subjected to 'overbearing or harass-
ing' police conduct .. on the basis of imprecise stereotypes ... [or] irrelevant personal charac-
teristics such as race." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12. See United States v. Williams, 949 F.2d 220
(6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the agents, using the profile, followed the defendant because he
was a young African American male and as such fit within the profile), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2308 (1992). In dissent, Judge Jones noted that "[t]his court as well as others continue [sic] to
operate under the misapprehension that race plays less of a role in this Nation's treatment of
its citizens, in particular through its law enforcement agents, than reality compels." Id. at 222;
United States v. Taylor, No. 89-6396 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding the agents' use of a race-based
profile in a consensual stop). Id. at 25 (Damon, J,. dissenting). Because the majority in the
district court opinion concluded that the search was consensual, thereby excluding the race-
based profile as an issue, the dissent noted that "it [was] unnecessary to consider.., whether
... the alleged incorporation of a racial component into the DEA's drug profile.., violates an
individual's right[ ] to equal protection of the law." Id. "Recently, the Fifth Circuit observed:
the heart of the equal protection clause is its prohibition of discriminatory treatment. If a
governmental actor has imposed unequal burdens based on race, it has violated the clause."
Id. at 27-28 (citation omitted). See also Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925 (5th Cir.
1991).
260. The current status of drug courier profiles allows for misuse by law enforcement offi-
cials. Race, an immutable characteristic, is not, per se, indicative of criminal behavior, and
should always be an impermissible factor. Law enforcement officials' reliance on race-based
profile characteristics results in the targeting of various minority groups for heightened scru-
tiny and the increased likelihood of Fourth Amendment violations. Bezark, supra note 58, at
212. Courts must take care to ensure that the law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion
before the stop, and that the stop was not made on a "hunch." Id.
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26limited exception. 61 If the Court is unable to develop a profile that does not
offend Fourth Amendment principles, the use of the profile should be elimi-
nated.2 62 In its present form the costs simply outweigh the benefits.2 63
As a society, we cannot afford to fret away the civil rights that are at the
very heart of our system of government by making reactionary decisions in
face of what has now become a national crisis.2 64 The courts must heed the
warnings of those who have not lost sight of values which are fundamental
to our continued enjoyment of a society free from arbitrary governmental
control.2 65 If we choose to focus on problems which are of an immediate
and sensational nature, and lose sight of the principles that are responsible
for our society's allocation of power between the government and the indi-
vidual, then we may win the battle against drugs but lose a far more impor-
tant war against governmental intrusion on individual freedom.26 6
V. CONCLUSION
Terry v. Ohio cautiously limited the enigma of governmental encroach-
ment on individual liberties, and was intended to prevent broad and over-
reaching law enforcement tactics such as the drug courier profile.
Subsequent cases, however, have gone beyond the limited exception set forth
261. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-2 (1968). If a law enforcement agent relies solely on
the profile characteristics in making a stop, "the Terry standard probably will not be met, since
the police officer simply is not in a position to learn enough specific and articulable facts which
would give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Ledwin, supra note 40, at 609
(explaining how a police officer in his car is not in a position to establish reasonable suspicion
using a drug courier profile). Personal freedom has become a casualty in the war on drugs.
"The zealous pursuit of drug offenders ... [has resulted in] more aggressive investigative and
prosecutorial initiatives, generally supported by judicial validations." Wisotsky, supra note 1,
at 925. The measures that the courts have been willing to adopt in the war on drugs "dishon-
ors our legacy of limited government and natural rights, those 'principles of justice so rooted in
the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental.' " Id. at 926. Even
where there is no evidence of racial characteristics used as profile factors, "a question remains
as to the predictive value of profiles. Some profiles are undoubtedly more reliable than
others." Farmer, supra note 4, at 419. By using broad-based profiles, law enforcement officials
will only observe couriers who exhibit profile traits. Agents looking for Hispanic female couri-
ers would not arrest white male couriers. Id. at 420.
262. See United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402, 1405 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that "the
valiant efforts of our law enforcement officers to rid society of the drug scourge cannot be done
in total disregard of an individual's constitutional rights"); United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d
357, 361 (6th Cir. 1990) (asserting that "[t]he drug crisis does not license the aggrandizement
of governmental power in lieu of civil liberties"). "Despite the devestation wrought by drug
trafficking... nationwide, we cannot suspend the precious rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion in an effort to fight the 'War on Drugs.' " Id. See also supra notes 245, 258.
263. See supra notes 1-3, 6-7.
264. See supra notes 1-3, 6-7.
265. See supra notes 260-62.
266. See supra notes 260-62.
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in Terry and allowed for arbitrary governmental intrusion in hopes of stem-
ming the illegal flow of drugs into the United States.
The Court must establish the parameters of the drug courier profile within
the limited Fourth Amendment exception already articulated in Terry. In
facing this nation's drug problem, we, as a society, must avoid the loss of
Fourth Amendment protections. Our system of government has survived
because society has maintained proper safeguards and restraints on govern-
ment power. The courts must carefully maintain the delicate balance be-
tween individual freedom and liberty and the needs of society for an effective
government. An uneven allocation of power in an effort to facilitate the war
on drugs will, in the long run, come at the expense of both individual liberty
and the effectiveness of government.
Michael R. Cogan
